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THE SUPREME COURT ANDTHE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE 1993-94 TERM
Elliot M. Mincberg°
During its 1993-94 term, and for the fourth time in the last
five years, the Supreme Court experienced a change in judicial
personnel with the retirement of Justice Harry Blackmun' and the
nomination and confirmation of Justice Stephen Breyer. 2 As the
confirmation process proceeded, perhaps the most frequent
characterization of Justice Breyer was that he is a "pragmatist" and
a "moderate."3 Not an ideologue who would seek to push the Court
far in any direction, Justice Breyer was described as a practical judge
who would help the Court avoid extremes, and who would also
follow a moderate course in many areas. 4
Without disputing the popular characterization of Justice
Breyer, however, it became clear in the 1993-94 term that at least
with respect to the First Amendment, the pre-Breyer Supreme Court
was already quite capable of avoiding extremes and pursuing
moderation.5 In three significant cases in which the Court was
Legal Director, People for the American Way, Washington, D.C.; J.D. 1977,
Harvard University, B.A. 1974, Northwestern University. The author and People for
the American Way gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Jonathan P. Scott, Tom
Gordon, and Dacia M. Riley, summer legal interns at People for the American Way,
without whose work this Article would not have been possible.
I See Richard S. Arnold, Justice Harry Blackmun: Some Personal Notes, 43 AM.
U. L. REv. 699, 699 (1994).
2 See Linda Greenhouse, Plaudits Drown Out Critics as Senate Confirms Breyer,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at A6.
' See, e.g., David Margolick, Scholarly Consensus Builder, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
1994, at Al; Gwen Ijill, Pragmatic Jurist, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1994, at Al; Joan
Biskupic, A Moderate Pragmatist: Nominee Widely Admired in Legal Circles, WASH.
POST, May 14, 1994, at Al.
4 See Ijill, supra note 3, at Al.
See David M. O'Brien, Split Decisions... The Right Wing of the U.S. Supreme
Court Has Been Nearly Vanquished by the Centrist Majority, COLUMBIAN, Oct. 30,
1994, at 6 (describing how control of the Supreme Court by centrists has resulted in
fewer cases being heard in an effort to cease the overturning of liberal precedents by
arch-conservatives).
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divided on First Amendment questions, the majority chose a
"moderate" course in between more extreme positions advocated by
dissenters. For example, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC,' which concerned federal legislation requiring that cable
television companies "must carry" certain local broadcast television
signals, the majority rejected both the view that the legislation should
be subjected to strict First Amendment scrutiny, and Justice Stevens'
suggestion that the law should be upheld.7 Instead, the Court
remanded the case for a more detailed review based on the
"intermediate scrutiny" standard.8 Similarly, in Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, Inc. ,' which concerned the validity of injunctive relief
against protesters outside an abortion clinic, the majority again
rejected strict scrutiny, but demanded more than intermediate
scrutiny, and approved part of the injunction while striking down the
remainder of it.'0  And, in Waters v. Churchill," the Court
effectively adopted another intermediate standard with respect to First
Amendment protection for government employees.' 2
Moderation was evident in other Supreme Court First
Amendment decisions as well. In two rulings, one concerning
government regulation of signs on private property, 3 and another
interpreting the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations law,' 4 the Court was unanimous in result and, for the
most part, in rationale.' 5 And in the Court's only Establishment
Clause decision this term, Board of Education of Village of Kiryas
Joel v. Grumet,'6 the majority again rejected attempts to substantially
weaken church-state separation, but also clearly stated that
6 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994); see discussion infra part II.E.
7 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2473.
8 Id. at 2469, 2472.
9 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994); see discussion infra part II.A.
10 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521, 2524.
" 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994); see discussion infra part II.B.
12 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1884.
"3 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2040 (1994) (discussing LADUE,
Mo., ORDINANCES § 35-1-10 (1991)).
14 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988); see NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798,803 (1994).
11 Gi~leo, 114 S. Ct. at 2038; Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 798. For a discussion of
Gilleo, see infra part B.C. For a discussion of Scheidler, see infra part II.A.
16 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994); see discussion infra part I.
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accommodation of religion is appropriate under some circumstances.17
The Court also reached a pragmatic result in this case by striking
down a statute seeking to accommodate the religious and educational
concerns of a Satmar Hasidim village.' 8 The Court held that the
statute violated key constitutional principles, which demand religious
neutrality by government.' 9
The Court's voting patterns in the seven First Amendment
cases decided in the 1993-94 term also offer interesting results. One
Justice voted with the majority in all seven cases-Justice
Souter-who wrote the majority opinion in Kiryas Joel,20 and
important concurring opinions in NOW v. Scheidler2' and Waters.22
At the other extreme, Justices Scalia and Thomas voted against the
majority in three of the seven cases,2 3 and voted identically with each
other in all seven.24
This Article will review each of the Court's First
Amendment-related decisions during the 1993-94 term. These
include the Establishment Clause ruling in Kiryas Joel and six
decisions relating to free speech issues.
L The Establishment Clause: Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District
v. Grumet,2 the Supreme Court held, six to three, that a New York
statute, which created a school district coterminous with the boundary
lines of a village that is a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidic Jewish
'7 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2494.
18 Id.
19 Id.
21 d. at 2481.
2 114 S. Ct. at 806.
2 114 S. Ct. at 1891.
2 See Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2481; Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2516; Turner, 114 S.
Ct. at 2445.
24 See Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 800; Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2040; Ibanez, 114 S. Ct.
at 2086; Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1893; Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2481; Madsen, 114 S.
Ct. at 2516; Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2445.
2 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
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sect,26 violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.27
Under what may be unique factual circumstances, the Court
determined that this statute impermissibly advanced religion.2" The
Court's decision again disappointed those, like Justice Scalia,29 who
have sought fundamental change in the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. ° But the decision offers significant insights into the
Justices' thinking in the area of the Establishment Clause."
Kiryas Joel is a community located in Orange County, New
York, which is occupied exclusively by the Satmar Hasidim,
practitioners of a specific, strict form of Judaism. 2 In 1977, under
state law, the incorporators of Kiryas Joel drew their village
boundaries in order to exclude all but the Satmar Hasidim from this
community.33 The village fell within the Monroe-Woodbury Central
School District until 1989, when the New York Legislature passed
Chapter 748," which carved out a separate district following Kiryas
Joel village lines."
The residents of Kiryas Joel go to great lengths to maintain
their separate religious and social identity. Children of the village are
2 Id. at 2484-85.
r' Id. at 2484.
2 See id. at 2494.
21 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2141, 2149 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Referring to the Establishment Clause test
of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), Justice Scalia stated: "Like some ghoul
in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence
again." Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149.
30 See, e.g., All Things Considered: Court Rules Kiryas Joel School Unconstitutional,
(National Public Radio radio broadcast, June 27, 1994), available in LEXIS, News
Library, CURNWS File ("[Moday's court ruling was a bitter dissapointment for
conservative religious groups and judicial philosophers, who, beginning in the mid-
1980's, had seen signs that the increasingly conservative Supreme Court was preparing
to abandon decades of liberal decisions.").
11 This is largely due to the fact that six separate opinions were filed by the Court.
Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2484.
32 Id. at 2483.
3 Id.
1 1989 N.Y. Laws, ch. 748.
31 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2483.
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educated in private religious schools. 6 Boys receive a thorough
grounding in the Torah, and limited exposure to secular subjects,
while girls are educated in a separate school designed to prepare them
for their roles as wives and mothers." The religious schools in
Kiryas Joel do not, however, provide any specific services to disabled
children, who are entitled, under federal and state law, to special
education services even if enrolled in private schools.38
In 1984, the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District
started providing special education services to the children of Kiryas
Joel in the annex of a religious school.39 In light of Supreme Court
decisions limiting the provision of such services to religious school
students on religious school grounds,' this service was terminated. 41
As a result, children from Kiryas Joel who needed special education
were required to attend public schools outside the village.42 The
parents of several students sought review of the public school
placements of their children, while other parents withdrew their
children from Monroe-Woodbury secular schools, citing "the panic,
fear and trauma [the children] suffered in leaving their own
community and being with people whose ways were so different from
theirs. ,
By 1989, only one disabled child from Kiryas Joel was
attending Monroe-Woodbury's public schools; the village's other
handicapped children received privately funded special education
services or went without such services altogether." In 1989, the
New York Legislature passed Chapter 748, providing that the Village




, See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985) (holding that a New York City
program, which used federal funds to pay salaries of public school employees who taught
in parochial schools, violated the Establishment Clause); School Dist. of Grand Rapids
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,397 (1985) (holding that school district programs, which provided
classes to nonpublic school students at public expense in classrooms located in and leased
from nonpublic schools, violated the Establishment Clause).
41 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 2481, 2485.
44 Id. at 2486.
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of Kiryas Joel "constituted a separate school district .. and shall
have and enjoy all the powers and duties of a union free school
district. "45 Although the Kiryas Joel School District had plenary legal
authority over elementary and secondary education of all school-aged
children in the village,46 the district chose to open only a special
education program for handicapped children as a public school.47
Other students in the village were to continue to receive private
religious education.4"
Several months before the new district began operation, the
New York School Board Association and two of its officials
challenged the law as an unconstitutional establishment of religion.49
The Kiryas Joel Village School District and the Monroe-Woodbury
Central School District intervened as defendants.5"
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled
that the statute violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment." A divided appellate division affirmed, on the grounds
that Chapter 748 had the primary effect of advancing religion, in
violation of both the federal and state constitutions.52 The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed on the federal question, determining that,
because both the district's public school population and its school
board would be exclusively Hasidic, the statute created a "symbolic
union of church and state" that was "likely to be perceived by the
Satmar Hasidim as an endorsement of their religious choices, or by
nonadherents as a disapproval" of their own." The Supreme Court
stayed the mandate of the court of appeals,' and granted certiorari to
address the sole issue of whether creating the separate school district
4s 1989 N.Y. Laws, ch. 748 § 1.
46 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1994).
47 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2486.
48 id.
49 Grumet v. Board of Educ., 592 N.Y.S.2d 123, 125-26 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1992). The state appellate court ruled that the Association and its officers lacked
standing to challenge the constitutionality of Chapter 748, but the officials proceeded
with the challenge in their capacities as citizen-taxpayers. Id. at 126.
50 Id.
SI Grumet v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1007-08 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
52 Grumet, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
5 Grumet v. Board of Educ., 618 N.E.2d 94, 100 (N.Y. 1993).
4 Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1994).
1994] SUPREME COURT: 1993-94 TERM 37
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."
Relying in large measure on Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. ,56
Justice Souter, writing for the Court majority, determined that
Chapter 748 violated the Establishment Clause.57 In Larkin, the
Court struck down a Massachusetts statute granting religious bodies
veto power over applications for liquor licenses. 58  The Court
determined in Larkin that a state may not delegate its civic authority
to a group chosen according to a religious criterion. 9 Justice Souter
explained in Kiryas Joel that the authority over public schools "'ranks
at the very apex of the function of a State.'"" In accordance with
Larkin, the Court plurality concluded that this authority could not be
delegated by the State to a local school district, defined by the State,
in order to grant political control to a religious group, such as the
Satmar Hasidim.6
Although the beneficiaries of government authority were
religious leaders and officers in Larkin, while in Kiryas Joel the
beneficiaries were a group of religious individuals united by a
common doctrine, the plurality found this factor unimportant in its
analysis."2 Justice Souter wrote:
Although some school district franchise is common to
all voters, the State's manipulation of the franchise
for this district limited it to Satmars, giving the sect
exclusive control of the political subdivision. In the
circumstances of this case, the difference between
thus vesting state power in the members of a religious
55 Id.
459 U.S. 116 (1982).
57 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2488. Most of Justice Souter's opinion was joined by
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg. Id. Justice O'Connor did not
join the portion of the opinion which focused on improper delegation of governmental
authority, meaning that a plurality of four Justices agreed with that rationale. Id.
Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, but not the rationale of the Court. Id. at 2500.
" Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127.
'9 Id. at 123.
60 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2494 (quoting Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213
(1972)).
63 Id. at 2481.
Id. at 2488.
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group as such instead of the officers of its sectarian
organization is one of form, not substance."'
The plurality looked beyond the mere words of Chapter 748, and
examined the context in which the legislature passed the law."
In this regard, the plurality determined that when the New
York Legislature enacted Chapter 748, the lawmakers were well
aware of the fact that the incorporators of Kiryas Joel drew the
village's boundary lines so that the village would be comprised solely
of Satmar Hasidim.6" The plurality also found it troubling that the
carving out of the Kiryas Joel School District ran counter to
customary districting practices in the state-following the lines of the
Satmar Hasidim religious community where "customary and neutral
principles would not have dictated the same result. "" For these
reasons, the plurality agreed that the delegation of governmental
authority to a school district effectively defined by its religious
doctrinal adherence was a "'purposeful and forbidden fusion of
governmental and religious functions"' in violation of the
Establishment Clause.67
The Court also found that Chapter 748 was defective because
the benefit conferred by the law applied only to a single sect, the
Satmar Hasidim. 61 "A proper respect for both the Free Exercise
Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward
religion, . . . favoring neither one religion over others nor religious
' Id. The Court plurality distinguished McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978),
which held that religious people, or groups of religious people, cannot, because of their
religious activities, be denied the right to hold political office. Id. The Court
determined that this principle was not relevant in Kiryas Joel because it does not mean
that a state "may deliberately delegate discretionary power to an individual, institution,
or community on the ground of religious identity." Id. at 2489. Although Chapter 748
did not expressly extend authority by reference to the religious belief of the Satmar
community, the Court nonetheless concluded that Chapter 748 effectively identified the
recipients of the governmental authority by reference to their doctrinal adherence. Id.
6 Id. at 2484-86.
6Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
6Id. at 2490.
Id. (quoting Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963))).
6' Id. at 2491.
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adherents collectively over nonadherents. "69 Justice Souter expressed
concern that the New York Legislature would fail to exercise its
governmental authority in a neutral manner, focusing on the case-
specific manner in which the New York Legislature created the
Kiryas Joel Village School District.7" Because the Kiryas Joel Village
School District did not receive its authority simply as one of many
communities eligible for equal treatment under a general law, the
Court had no "assurance that the next similarly situated group seeking
a school district of its own will receive one."7" Justice Souter wrote
that the Court had no direct way to review such state action for the
purpose of "safeguarding a principle at the heart of the Establishment
Clause. "72
The plurality rejected the argument that Chapter 748 was an
appropriate accommodation of religion, explaining that the law clearly
crossed the line separating permissible accommodation from
impermissible establishment.73 Although the Court acknowledged that
the Constitution allows a state to accommodate religious needs by
alleviating special burdens, it also recognized that "accommodation
is not a principle without limits. "' Although prior Court decisions
had endorsed governmental accommodation in various forms,75
Justice Souter explained that these decisions do not indicate that an
"unconstitutional delegation of political power to a religious group
could be saved as a religious accommodation." 76
The plurality explained that its decision did not foreclose
Id. at 2487 (citing Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
793-94 (1973)).
70 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2491.
71 id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 2492.
74 d.
75 See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Later-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987) (holding that the government may allow
religious organizations to favor their own adherents in hiring, even for secular
employment); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308-15 (1952) (holding that government
may allow public schools to release students during the school day to receive off-site
religious education).
76 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2493.
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other ways to respond to the needs of disabled Kiryas Joel students."
Justice Souter suggested that services could have been provided at a
neutral site in the nearby Monroe-Woodbury School.78 According to
a concurring opinion by Justice Stevens, with whom Justices
Blackmun and Ginsburg joined, the State could have taken steps to
alleviate the children's fears by teaching their schoolmates to be
"tolerant and respectful of Satmar customs. "79 Such steps would not
have raised "constitutional concerns and would further the strong
public interest in promoting diversity and understanding in the public
schools." 0 Justice Stevens concluded that the State instead chose to
enact Chapter 748, which "supports a religious sect's interest in
segregating itself and preventing its children from associating with
their neighbors."8"
Justice Kennedy concurred in the result reached by the Court,
explaining that although he believed that a legislature can permissibly
accommodate the "unique problems of a particular religious group,"
the legislation was impermissible in this case because political
boundaries were drawn "on the basis of religion."82 Justice
O'Connor, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, took
a different approach to the issue of accommodation." Based on the
history and the surrounding statutory scheme of Chapter 748, Justice
O'Connor saw the law as an impermissible grant of religious
favoritism, as opposed to a general accommodation through neutrally
applicable legislation." Both Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy
criticized previous Court decisions, such as Aguilar v. Felton,"5 which
held that government sponsored special education services could not
be provided on-site at parochial schools, yet could be provided at
77 id.
7 Id.
' Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J., concurring).
g Id.
"1 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2495 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy explained that, although
the legislature had not explicitly stated that it was acting based on religion, it clearly
"knew" that everyone within the village was Satmar and "in effect [employed] a religious
test." Id. at 2504.
83 Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"Id. at 2498.
8 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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public and non-parochial schools. 6 Justice O'Connor characterized
this as impermissibly promoting "animosity," rather than
"impartiality," towards religion.87 Coupled with the more extreme
views of the three dissenters in Kiryas Joel, the opinions of Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor strongly suggest that a majority of the Court
is prepared to reconsider and overrule Aguilar and related
decisions. 8
Justice O'Connor also criticized Lemon v. Kurtzman,89 another
of the Court's Establishment Clause precedents." Although not
calling for the explicit overruling of Lemon, O'Connor suggested that
the "unitary test" for Establishment Clause violations in Lemon is not
sufficiently sensitive to different fact patterns and categories of
cases. 9' Even if accepted by a majority of the Court, Justice
O'Connor's view does not necessarily signal a revolution in
constitutional jurisprudence, because, as she observed, the Court has
increasingly decided Establishment Clause cases without specific
reference to the Lemon test.92 Justice O'Connor also stated that even
abandoning the test itself "need not mean abandoning some of the
insights that the test reflected," such as the principle that government
speech, which "endorses or disapproves of religion," violates the
Establishment Clause. 93 In addition, Justice Blackmun's concurring
Id. at 411-12 (reasoning that the secondary schools in this case were not
"pervasively sectarian," had a "substantial" effect of indoctrinating religious values and
would thus require ongoing inspection to "ensure the absence of a religious message");
see Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2505 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
" Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring).'
See id. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
oIn Lemon, the Court concluded that statutes which provided state aid to religious
schools involved "excessive entanglement" between the government and religion, and,
therefore violated, the Establishment Clause. Id. at 603. The Court reasoned that
religion must be a private matter for an individual, family, and institutions of private
choice without government involvement. Id. at 625.
9' Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2499-2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Government
action violates the Establishment Clause if it: (1) has the purpose of advancing religion;
(2) has the primary effect of advancing religion or inhibiting religion; or (3)
impermissibly entangles government with religion. See Lemon, 403 U.S at 612-13.
1 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9' Id. at 2500.
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opinion specifically noted that the plurality did not depart from
Lemon, and appeared to implicitly, if not explicitly, rest on several
of Lemon's criteria.' At the very least, however, O'Connor's
opinion explicitly suggests that while Lemon and its principles may
continue to be applied by the Court, it will not provide the exclusive
test by which Establishment Clause violations will be measured."
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Thomas,
vigorously dissented from the Court's determination that Chapter 748
was an impermissible establishment of religion.96 According to
Justice Scalia, Larkin was totally inapplicable because it prohibited
governmental delegation of civil authority to a church, not citizens
who share a common religion.9 7 To Justice Scalia, this was a critical
factor that made Larkin "unique and rare," and characterized Justice
Souter's dismissal of this distinction as "breathtaking," and as casting
doubt on the constitutionality even of the admission of the
predominantly Mormon State of Utah.98 Justice Scalia also criticized
Justice Souter's willingness to believe that it was the theological
distinctiveness, as opposed to the cultural distinctiveness of Kiryas
Joel residents, that was the basis for New York's decision to allow
the residents to operate their own school district." According to
Scalia, it was a "remarkable stretch" for the Court to say that the law
was motivated by a desire to favor, or disfavor, a particular religious
group, because it was quite logical that the geographical boundaries
selected for the district were those that already existed for the
village." °  Moreover, even if the school district was created to
accommodate the Satmars' religion, Scalia argued that the Court's
decision is "at war" with "traditional accommodation doctrine. "01
As Justice Souter's opinion deftly observed, the "gladiator"-
like dissent of Justice Scalia "thrusts at lions of his own
Id. at 2494-95 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 2499 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2507 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Is Id.
99 Id. at 2509.
100 Id. at 2508.
1"' Id. at 2513.
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imagining."'" Unlike the State of Utah, which was "laid out
according to traditional political methodologies taking account of lines
of latitude and longitude and topographical features," Souter
explained, the Kiryas Joel district line was "purposely drawn to
separate Satmars from non-Satmars. " 3 This factor, coupled with the
principle of "neutrality toward religion as well as among religious
sects," clearly made the difference in regards to the Mormon-
dominated State of Utah's admission to the Union. °4 Despite the
vigorous dissent by Scalia in Kiryas Joel, as in previous cases,10 5 the
Court majority continued to adhere to this fundamental principle of
neutrality with respect to the Establishment Clause.
II. Freedom of Speech
The remaining Supreme Court decisions on the First
Amendment in the 1993-94 term focused on speech issues in a range
of contexts. These included cases dealing with abortion and free
speech, free speech rights of government employees, regulation of
professional advertising, speech on private property, and cable
television.
'02 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2493.
3 id. at 2494.
1o Id. Following the issuance of the Court's decision, the New York State
Legislature enacted a statute that re-established the Kiryas Joel School District. See
Gary Spencer, SchoolDistrict Measure Affirmed, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 9, 1995, at 1. Justice
Lawrence E. Kahn, who struck down the 1984 statute establishing the district, held that
the new statute was constitutional, and is "a 'general law' that would enable any city,
village or town to create its own district if it met certain 'religion-neutral' conditions."
Id. (quoting Justice Lawrence E. Kahn).
" See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2683-86 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
44 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XII
A. Abortion and Free Speech: Madsen v. Women's Health
Center and NOW v. Scheidler
In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. , the Court was
asked to decide the constitutionality of a state court injunction limiting
certain forms of protest by anti-abortion protesters outside an abortion
clinic.1 7 The Court ultimately upheld some parts of the injunction,
while holding other parts unconstitutional."0 8 In doing so, the Court
articulated a new standard for analyzing content-neutral injunctions
that restrict speech." ° Under the new standard, courts must ask
"whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest."'
10
Madsen concerned a series of Operation Rescue"' protests
which impeded access to an abortion clinic in Melbourne, Florida.1
12
Based on evidence of disruption and harassment, a state court initially
entered a speech-neutral injunction, which enjoined Operation Rescue
from interfering with access to the clinic or physically harassing
persons entering or leaving it."1 Some six months later, the court
found that, despite the initial injunction, protesters continued to
impede clinic access, and to physically and otherwise harass patients,
doctors, and clinic personnel."14 The court accordingly concluded
that additional injunctive relief was necessary "to protect the health,
safety and rights" of clinic staff and patients."'
The new, broader injunction prevented the protesters from
"6 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
107 id. at 2518.
10' id. at 2530.
109 Id. at 2525.
110 Id.
"I Operation Rescue, a national pro-life organization, is well known for its protests
outside of medical clinics where abortions are performed. See Michael Kinsley, Why
Not Kill the Baby Killers?, TiME, Aug. 15, 1994, at 64. The organization's stated
purpose is to persuade doctors and patients to adopt the view that abortion is equivalent
to the murder of innocent children. Id.
112 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2521.
113 Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla.
1993).
"I Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 667.
'is Id.
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entering the clinic or its property, interfering with access to the
clinic, or "congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or
entering" the public or private property within thirty-six feet of the
clinic. 16 It also restricted protestors from projecting sound and visual
images into the clinic during certain hours, approaching patients of
the clinic within 300 feet of the property without the patients'
consent, and protesting within 300 feet of clinic employees' homes. 117
The injunction was upheld by the Florida Supreme Court on
the grounds that it was content neutral and "narrowly-tailored to serve
a significant government interest, . . [leaving] open ample
alternative channels of communication. ""' In a separate challenge to
the same injunction, however, the Eleventh Circuit, in Cheffer v.
McGregor,"9 struck down the injunction, finding it to be content
based and neither necessary to serve a compelling state interest, nor
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' In granting certiorari in
Madsen,12 1 the Supreme Court sought to resolve the conflict between
the state and federal courts. 122
Not surprisingly, the Court was divided, issuing four
opinions, and upholding some parts of the injunction while striking
down others.' Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
started his analysis by assessing whether the injunction was content
or viewpoint based. 24 Recognizing that injunctions, by their nature,
target a particular group, the Chief Justice said that this alone was not
enough to make such a measure content based."z In this case, the
majority found that the restrictions were "incidental to the . . . anti-
id. at 679.
117 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2522-23.
"t Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 671.
"9 6 F.3d 705, 711 (11th Cir. 1993).
120 Id.
1 Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 907 (1994).
122 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
' Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority. Id. at 2521. Justice Souter filed
a concurring opinion. Id. at 2531. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part. Id. at 2533. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined.
id. at 2534.
124 Id. at 2523.
12 Id. at 2519.
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abortion message," and that there was no evidence to show that pro-
abortion protesters engaging in comparable activity would not have
been subjected to a similar injunction. 2 6 Essentially, the protesters
were being restricted not because they were protesting abortion, but
because they were protesting in violation of the law and injuring
others.127 Therefore, the Court concluded that the injunction was
indeed content neutral. 128
Typically, when a restriction on speech is found to be content
neutral, the Court has followed the traditional intermediate scrutiny
standard. 129  That standard involves determining whether the
restriction is "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest," and leaves sufficient alternative avenues of communication
available to the speaker. 3 ' In Madsen, however, the majority
distinguished statutory or ordinance-based restrictions-where this
standard has often been applied-from injunctive restrictions.' The
majority reasoned that "[o]rdinances represent a legislative choice
regarding the promotion of particular societal interests," and apply to
society as a whole rather than a particular "minority. ,132 Injunctions,
however, "carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory
application than do general ordinances.""3 The majority, therefore,
explained that a "more stringent" standard was appropriate for
injunctive restrictions on speech.' 34
In articulating this "stringent standard," the Court looked to
the general principle "that injunctive relief should be no more
burdensome to the defendants than necessary to provide complete
relief to the plaintiffs." 3 ' Rather than simply requiring that the relief
be "narrowly tailored," the Court said that the test should be
'i Id. at 2524.
'"Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
128 id. at 2524.
I" See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988), Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
30 See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
"' 114 S. Ct. at 2524.
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"whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest. 1
36
The majority quickly determined that "significant government
interests" existed in this case,1 37 including the State's interests in
protecting a woman's constitutional right to abortion under Roe v.
Wade, 3 1 in promoting "public safety and order," and in preserving
"medical privacy"-just as there had been an interest in protecting
residential privacy in Frisby v. Schultz. 39 Under the Court's First
Amendment test for injunctions, however, it was necessary to
determine whether the various provisions of the injunction were
restricting "no more speech than necessary. 11140
In performing this analysis, the Chief Justice broke the
injunction down into separate elements, applying the test to each
restriction. Looking first at the ban on protests within the thirty-six
foot buffer zone, he recognized that this zone encompassed both
private and public property.' 4' The restriction on protest on public
property-namely, the road providing access to the clinic-was
designed to protect access to and from the clinic.' 42 Although the
majority recognized that the "no more speech than necessary"
requirement might be read to mandate a smaller, or even no buffer
zone, it upheld that portion of the injunction, and deferred to the state
court's familiarity with the facts of the dispute, particularly in light
of the failure of the first order, which provided for no buffer zone.' 43
However, in the absence of evidence that it was necessary to include
private property within the buffer zone to protect access to the clinic,
the Court invalidated that part of the injunction. 1"
The Court next looked at the restrictions on sound and visual
images, once again choosing to uphold one type of restriction, but not
' Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2525.
's Id. at 2526.
'3 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526.
13' See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474. 484 (1988) (upholding law banning targeted
residential picketing); Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526.
", Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2526.
'41 Id. at 2526-27.
142 Id. at 2527.
143 Id.
1"d. at 2527-28.
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an other. With respect to the sound restrictions, the Court cited
previous decisions in which it had recognized the particular need for
peace and quiet in the area of hospitals and other medical facilities
"'where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of the
day's activity,"" 45 as well as the State's right to "'turn . . down"'
sound, even if it conveys First Amendment-protected speech.146
Thus, the Court upheld the Florida court's restrictions on sound
within earshot of the clinic. 147
But the Court refused to extend that same conclusion to visual
images. The majority found that the "broad prohibition on all
'images observable' burdens more speech than necessary to achieve
the purpose of limiting threats to clinic patients or their families.""'
In distinguishing visual images from sound, the majority noted that
"it is much easier for the clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient
to stop up her ears.""'.'
The majority also found the provision preventing protesters
from approaching patients within 300 feet of the clinic without their
consent to be overbroad. 5 ' The Justices were concerned that the
injunction prohibited "all uninvited approaches of persons seeking the
services of the clinic, regardless of how peaceful the contact may
be. "'m  This broad prohibition clashed with the principle that
"'citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in
order to °provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected
by the First Amendment. ",152
The final provision analyzed by the Court was the prohibition
on demonstrating within 300 feet of the residences of clinic staff.153
The Court distinguished the restriction from the one it had upheld in
' Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528 (quoting Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483,
509 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
"I d. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972)).
147 Id. at 2528.
'48 Id. at 2529.
149 Id.
"
0 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
ild. at 2529.
2Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1987)).
153 7d.
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Frisby."4 In Frisby, recognizing "the unique nature of the home, [as]
'the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick,"' the Court
upheld a restriction on "'focused picketing,"' targeting a particular
residence."' The Madsen Court, however, found that the city's 300
foot zone was much too broad."5 6 Instead of the 300 foot prohibition,
the Court suggested that "a limitation on the time [and] duration of
picketing, and number of pickets outside a smaller zone could have
accomplished the desired result."157
The majority opinion faced partial dissents from both
ideological directions. Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's
judgment that the injunction was content neutral, and with its analysis
of the "in concert" language. 5 8 He came to the opposite conclusion
on what standard to apply, however, arguing that injunctions should
be judged "by a more lenient standard than legislation. "'19 Justice
Stevens explained that "legislation is imposed on an entire
community, regardless of individual culpability. By contrast,
injunctions apply- solely to an individual or a limited group of
individuals who, by engaging in illejal conduct, have been judicially
deprived of some liberty-the normal consequence of illegal
activity.""' Based on this standard, and on the trial court's finding
of the harm caused by protesters' harassment of patients, Justice
Stevens argued that the 300 foot "no approach" zone around the clinic
' Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2529; see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988).
Ss 487 U.S. at 487 (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 379 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black,
J., concurring)).
15 114 S. Ct. at 2530.
ss'Id. The protesters in Madsen also challenged the injunction as being "vague and
overbroad." Id. Specifically, they protested language making the injunction applicable
to the named parties. Id. The Court rejected this claim on two grounds. First, it found
that the petitioners had no standing to bring such a claim because they themselves were
named parties. Id. Second, the Court noted that the injunction was not overbroad in
prohibiting conduct, but rather was "simply directed at unnamed parties who might later
be found to be acting 'in concert' with the named parties," in a manner typically utilized
in injunctive orders. Id.
"8 Id. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
159 Id.
160 Id.
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was valid. 161
Justice Scalia, meanwhile, in an opinion joined by Justices
Kennedy and Thomas, went to the other extreme, arguing that strict
scrutiny should apply to injunctions, including content-neutral
injunctions.162 Justice Scalia's dissent, lengthy and often stinging,
was based in large measure on his view that the majority was
allowing its views on abortion to influence the case. 63 Scalia took
this position despite the fact that the author of the majority opinion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, had joined with him in voting to overrule
Roe v. Wade on several occasions. t64
With respect to the standard to be applied to content-neutral
injunctions, Justice Scalia suggested several reasons why strict
scrutiny was appropriate. First, he argued that even if an injunction
does not attack "content as content," the very fact that it is inherently
directed toward a specific group of people means it will restrict a
particular point of view. 6 ' Second, he maintained that by leaving
such decisions to individual judges rather than legislators, the risk of
unwarranted restriction is greater, particularly if such a judge is
"chagrined" because the particular group has already disobeyed her
orders.'"4 And finally, he explained that an injunction is a more
powerful weapon than a statute because it subjects a violator to
contempt proceedings. 6 7  Although Justice Scalia admitted that an
injunction may be challenged as unconstitutional on appeal, as was
"6I Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2532-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Justice Stevens maintained that the other portions of the injunction concerning
sound, images, and residential picketing were not properly before the Court, although
he suggested that he was inclined to agree with the majority on the noise and image
provisions. Id. at 2531-33.
112 Id. at 2538 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
,63 Id. at 2535.
I" See Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2855-56
(1992) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (voting to erode Roe by
stating that the right to choose to have an abortion, because it involves the taking of a
potential life, should be subject to a balancing test rather than strict scrutiny); Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190 (1991) (eroding Roe by approving the withholding of
government-funded abortion family planning after concluding that it is not a violation of
guaranteed constitutional rights).
1"0 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2538-39 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
6 Id. at 2539.
16 Id.
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done in this case, he cited the "collateral bar rule" enunciated in
Walker v. Birmingham168 for the proposition that a party charged with
contempt for violating an injunction may not challenge its
constitutionality. 169
Scalia's dissent also criticized the manner in which the
majority used, or failed to use, precedent to support its conclusions.
He particularly focused on the Court's decision in NAACP v.
Clairborne Hardware, Inc.,170 where the Court explained that "[t]he
right to associate does not lose all constitutional protection merely
because some members of the group may have participated in conduct
or advocated doctrine that itself is not protected."171 Scalia claimed
that by allowing the use of the Madsen injunction against a broad
group of pro-life protesters, the Court was acting contrary to its
ruling in Clairborne Hardware.172 The majority responded, however,
that by applying its "burden no more speech than necessary"
standard, the Court adhered to the principle of Clairborne
Hardware. "'
Finally, Justice Scalia maintained that the injunction was
unconstitutional even if it was based on the majority's new test. 74
He claimed that the majority had not really demonstrated that the
interests at stake were "significant" because there was no violation of
any specific state law or ordinance, and, in his view, no violation of
the earlier injunction had taken place. 17' Additionally, the injunction
did not prohibit only as much speech as was truly necessary,
according to Justice Scalia, because other alternatives, such as
"a 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
'69 Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2539 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Scalia also argued that the injunction was not content neutral, based largely not
on the injunction itself, but on the way it had allegedly been applied only against pro-life
protesters. Id. at 2539-40. As Justice Souter noted in his concurring opinion, however,
the trial court indicated that the question of to whom the injunction was to properly apply
was to be determined on a case-by-case basis, and not based upon viewpoint. Id. at
2530 (Souter, J., concurring).
171 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
7Id. at 908.
'7' Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2541-43 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
171 Id. at 2525.
'7' Id. at 2544 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
'~ See id. at 2544-49.
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limiting the number of protesters in certain areas, could have been
attempted. 176
Madsen clearly presented an exceptionally difficult case for
the Court.'7 7 By adopting a standard somewhere in between strict
and intermediate scrutiny, and by employing a Solomonic "split the
baby 1178 approach to the injunction itself, the Court was able to
achieve a relatively clear majority opinion, and to permit both sides
to claim some measure of vindication. 179 The long-term effects of the
ruling, however, remain uncertain. The Court's approach will
necessarily make each future case of this variety-whether involving
abortion protests, labor pickets, or some other activity-highly
dependent on the particular facts involved.' It will also put a
premium on the judgments and findings reached by trial courts on
such questions as whether injunctions limit only as much speech as
is necessary, a question on which the Supreme Court Justices
obviously did not agree.
The second abortion-related case with free speech implications
considered by the Court in the 1993-94 term was NOW v.
Scheidler.'8 ' The case began when the National Organization for
Women (NOW), sued respondents Joseph Scheidler, the Pro-Life
Action Network, and others in federal court, alleging violations of the
Sherman Act8 2  and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) chapter of the Organized Crime Control Act
'76 Id. at 2548-49.
'77 See Steven P. Bann, Anti-Abortion Injunction Modified in Light of New Stricter
Standard, N.J. L.J., Dec. 5, 1994, at 49; David Cole, The Perils of Pragmatism, N.J.
L.J., Aug. 22, 1994, at 8 (discussing the Court's move from a reliance on the distinction
between content-neutral and content-based regulations to "a more pragmatic, case-by-
case balancing of the competing interests at stake").
'T' See 1 Kings 3:16.
'7 See Constitutional Law Scholars Assess Impact of Supreme Court's 1993-94 Term,
63 U.S.L.W. 2229, 2240 (Oct. 18, 1994) (discussing experts' opinions that the Court's
1993-94 term, including its decision in Madsen, were "cautious and middle-of-the-
road").
ISO See Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2523.
'8' 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
'n Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Pub. L. No. 103-325, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)).
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of 1970.183 NOW claimed that the respondents were part of a
"nationwide conspiracy to shut down abortion clinics through a
pattern of racketeering activity." 114
The district court dismissed the case as a matter of law,
holding that, because the activities involved political, not economic,
objectives, the Sherman Act did not apply.18 It also dismissed the
RICO claims brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) because the income
alleged by petitioners was "in no way ...derived from the pattern
of racketeering alleged in the complaint."18 6 The district court next
held that petitioners failed to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
because an economic motive is required for a RICO claim, and none
existed here.18 7  Finally, it dismissed the conspiracy claim under 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d) because the other RICO claims could not stand.88
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the petitioners'
claims.' 8 9 It adopted the district court's analysis of the claims under
§ 1962(a).19' Regarding the § 1962(c) claim, it held that "non-
economic crimes committed in furtherance of non-economic motives
are not within the ambit of RICO." '91 The court of appeals also
affirmed the dismissal of the claim under § 1962(d).192 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits on
the putative economic motive requirement of §§ 1962(c) and
1962(d). 193
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a unanimous Supreme
Court, which reversed the court of appeals, and held that RICO
"I Plaintiffs alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (c), and (d) (1988).
Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 800.
'" id. at 801.
,s NOW v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 941 (N.D. II. 1991).
196 Id.
'r7 Id. at 943.
10 Id. at 944.
18 NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 630-31 (7th Cir. 1992).
"0 Id. at 625.
"' id. at 629.
19 Id. at 630.
I" NOW v. Scheidler, 113 S. Ct. 2958 (1993). Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the
Third Circuit held that, if a predicate offense does not require an economic motive,
RICO likewise requires no additional economic motive. Northeast Women's Ctr, Inc.
v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1348-50 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
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contains no economic motive requirement.' While respondents and
several amici argued that the application of RICO to protesters might
chill legitimate expression, 95 the Court declined to address the First
Amendment issue. 96 The Court noted that "the question presented
for review asked simply whether the Court should create an unwritten
requirement limiting RICO to cases where either the enterprise or
racketeering activity has an overriding economic motive." 97
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote a brief
concurring opinion which discussed the First Amendment issues. 198
Souter dismissed the argument that, in order to avoid First
Amendment issues, RICO should be construed to require economic
motivation. '9 This argument was based on the principle of statutory
construction that a law "'must be construed with an eye to possible
constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to its validity.' "2
However, Souter noted that this principle "applies only when the
meaning of a statute is in doubt, and here the statutory language is
unambiguous. ,20'
Even if RICO's meaning were not clear, Justice Souter
suggested that it would not follow that the statute ought to be read to
include an economic-motive requirement because of free speech
concerns. 2' He explained that such a requirement would be both
overprotective and underprotective of expression.0 3 It would be
overprotective because "it would keep RICO from reaching
ideological entities whose members commit acts of violence we need
not fear chilling. ,24 On the other hand, it "might also prove to be
underprotective, because entities engaging in vigorous but fully
" Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 801. The Court's rationale as a matter of statutory
interpretation, focused on the "plain language" of RICO, which was absent of any
indication that an economic motive was required. Id. at 804.
"I Id. at 806 n.6.
196 Id.
197 Id.
,96 id. at 806 (Souter, J., concurring).
199 Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 807 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 806 (quoting Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573, 577 (1929)).
2' Id. at 807.
202 id.
20 Id.
I Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 807 (Souter, J., concurring).
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protected expression might fail the proposed. economic-motive test
(for even protest movements need money) and so be left exposed to
harassing RICO suits."20 5 Finally, Justice Souter maintained that an
economic-motive requirement is unnecessary because free speech
claims "may be raised and addressed in individual RICO cases as
they arise." 2" Souter specifically pointed out that nothing in the
Court's opinion would prevent a future RICO defendant from raising
a First Amendment defense, and that it is important "to caution courts
applying RICO to bear in mind the First Amendment interests that
could be at stake,"20 7 although the Court's opinion did not address
these issues.2 8 As Justice Souter's opinion emphasized, the Court
has left for another day the question of the potential conflict between
RICO and the First Amendment, 2" an issue that surely will arise in
individual RICO cases.
B. Free Speech Rights of Government Employees:
Waters v. Churchill
In its decision in Connick v. Myers,21 the Supreme Court
established a two-part test for deciding whether a government
employee's speech deserves First Amendment protection.2 n Under
the test, speech is protected if it is on "a matter of public concern, "212
and "the employee's interest in expressing herself on [the] matter [is
not] outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to 'the interest
of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.' "213 Inherent in the




I" d. at 806 n.6.
9 Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 807.
210 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
211 Id. at 142.
12 Id. at 146.
213 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1889 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 142 (quoting Pickering
v. Board of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968))).
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agree at least on the content of the speech they are fighting over. In
Waters v. Churchill,"4 the Court was asked to decide what to do
when the content of an employee's speech is in dispute.2"5 To put it
in Justice O'Connor's terms, Waters required the Court to decide the
"factual basis" for application of the Connick test.216
The government employee in Waters was Cheryl Churchill,
who worked in the obstetrics department of a public hospital in
Illinois.217 She had been overheard making certain remarks to a
fellow employee, who was considering transferring to the obstetrics
department. The alleged content of these remarks was later
reported .to several management officials, including Churchill's
supervisor, Cynthia Waters.21 9
According to Waters, Churchill had complained about the
obstetrics department, saying that it was generally a "bad place...
to work. "220 Waters considered this an attempt by Churchill to
discourage her colleague from transferring to the department, and
thus grounds for termination.221 Churchill claimed, however, that her
comments had largely related to her concerns about hospital policy,
and the resultant threat to patient care. 222 Furthermore, she claimed
that she had actually urged her colleague to transfer to obstetrics
because she was concerned about staff shortages, and the negative
effect they were having on the department. 2 3 Although both parties
claimed to have witnesses to support their contentions, Churchill was
fired.2 24
214 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
215 Id. at 1884.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 1882.
21 Id.
219 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1882-83.
Id. at 1882.
221 Id.
22 Id. at 1883.
2m Id.
224 See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1882-83. The conversation was overheard, in part, by
two nurses, MaryLou Ballew and Jean Welty, and by Dr. Thomas Koch. Id. at 1882.
While Ballew's version of the conversation supported Water's view, Koch's and Welty's
recollections of the conversation supported Churchill's. Id. at 1882-83.
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After exhausting her remedies within the hospital,2
Churchill filed suit in federal court, claiming she had been
fired in violation of her First Amendment rights under Connick.226
The district court rejected Churchill's claim, declaring that, even
according to her version of events, the speech did not relate to "a
matter of public concern," and even if it had, "its potential for
disruption nonetheless stripped it of First Amendment protection. "227
The Seventh Circuit reversed,22 finding that the speech,
"viewed in the light most favorable" to Churchill, was on a matter of
public concern as defihed by Connick.229 The court further concluded
that the inquiry must center on what the employee actually said, not
what the employer thought she said. 231 "If the employer chooses to
discharge the employee without sufficient knowledge of her protected
speech as a result of an inadequate investigation into the employee's
conduct. . ., the employer runs the risk of eventually being required
to remedy any wrongdoing whether it was deliberate or accidental. " 231
The Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit's decision,
and remanded the case,232 but could not reach a majority position on
the issue of which standard should have been applied by the trial
court. Justice O'Connor wrote for a plurality of four Justices, and
maintained that the employer's factual conclusion on the Connick
issue should be upheld, as long as it was reached in a "reasonable"
fashion.23 Justice Souter, a member of the plurality, also wrote a
concurring opinion emphasizing that an employer need not only carry
out a reasonable investigation of a third-party report, but must also
Id. The president of the hospital apparently met with Churchill, and then
reviewed reports by Waters and another management employee before rejecting
Churchill's grievance. Id.
2 Churchill v. Waters, 731 F. Supp. 311, 322 (C.D. Ill. 1990).
22 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1883-84.
22 Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1992).
2 Id. at 1127. The court of appeals described the public concern as "the hospital's
[alleged] violation of state nursing regulations as well as the quality and level of nursing
care it provides its patients." Id. at 1122.
230 Id. at 1127.
23 Id.
22 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1891.
233 Id. at 1884-91.
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actually believe that report.234 Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Thomas, concurred in the judgment, but argued that, as
long as the hospital simply acted in good faith, it should have been
protected from First Amendment liability. 25 Justice Stevens, who
was joined by Justice Blackmun in dissent, agreed with the Seventh
Circuit that the question of liability should be based on what a jury
decides the employee actually said, regardless of the level of
investigation instituted by the employer.236
As framed by Justice O'Connor in her plurality opinion, the
issue in Waters was how "the factual basis for applying the [Connick]
test-what the speech was, in what tone it was delivered, what the
listener's reactions were-is to be determined."237 Essentially, this
meant the Court had to decide what procedural safeguards a
government employer needed to follow before firing an employee for
the content of his or her speech. 238 Although Justice Stevens urged
the Court to require maximum safeguards, 239 and Justice Scalia urged
only minimal safeguards,24 the plurality ultimately chose a middle
ground-a test that allows the employer to base a decision to
reprimand or dismiss an employee on a "reasonable" belief that the
employee's speech was not protected by the First Amendment.U
Id. at 1891-93 (Souter, J., concurring). Although there was no majority opinion,
Justice Souter pointed out that, on remand, the trial court should clearly follow the
plurality's standard. Id. at 1893. This is because a majority of the court agreed that the
most an employer has to show is that he or she acted in a reasonable manner. Id. A
different majority agreed that an employer who unreasonably believes an employee's
speech was unprotected, and fires that employee will be held liable. Id. Thus, if the
trial court were to apply either a higher standard or a lower standard than that urged by
the plurality, it would be ignoring the will of a majority of the Court. Id.
3S Id. at 1893-98 (Scalia, J., concurring).
2m Id. at 1898-1900 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1884 (citation omitted).
2m See id. at 1886-88.
239 See id. at 1898 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plurality opinion is
.erroneous because it provides less protection for a fundamental constitutional right than
the law ordinarily provides for less exalted rights").
240 See id. at 1893 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that broadening First Amendment
procedural rights is "unprecedented, superfluous to the decision in the present case,
unnecessary for the protection of public-employee speech on matters of public concern,
and unpredictable in its application and consequences").
241 Id. at 1889.
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In rejecting the notion of maximum safeguards, Justice
O'Connor noted that, while a procedure that employs both employer
and jury review of an employee's speech might provide "more
protect[ion]," it was not necessarily required under the
Constitution.42 Rather than attempting to articulate a general test as
to what procedures are constitutionally required, the plurality
suggested that this question should properly be answered "on a case-
by-case basis ... [in light of] the particular context in which the
question arises. "243 Factors to be considered include "the cost of the
procedure and the relative magnitude and constitutional significance
of the risks it would decrease and increase." 2
In evaluating these factors, the plurality focused on the
difference between the government as employer versus the
government as sovereign in the First Amendment area. Justice
O'Connor explained that, while the government as sovereign must
narrowly target any permissible restrictions on speech, the
government as employer may enact broader restrictions.245 For
example, a government supervisor may establish a general rule
against being "'rude to customers,"' a standard which would clearly
be too vague and violate the First Amendment if applied to the
general public.246 In short, the plurality maintained that:
The government's interest in achieving its goals as
effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from
a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as
sovereign to a significant one when it acts as
employer .... [Therefore, w]here the government is
employing someone for the very purpose of
effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions [in the
name of efficiency] may well be appropriate. 7
242 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1885.




247 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888. Although the Court did not describe this as a
rational basis test, it might be so described. The plurality stated that, even though "[one
could make a respectable argument that political activity by government employees is
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Based on this analysis, the plurality explained that the court
of appeals had not given due deference to the government's role as
employer.248 If the factual question of what the employee said is
based on what is determined de novo by a juror or other fact-finder,
Justice O'Connor wrote, the government manager would be forced to
follow courtroom evidentiary standards, ignoring hearsay, and
personal knowledge of an employee's character and credibility.249 To
do otherwise would be to risk that a judge or jury would come to a
different conclusion, leaving the manager or her government
employer liable.2"' Justice O'Connor further stated that:
What works best in a judicial proceeding may not
be appropriate in the employment context. If one
employee accuses another of misconduct, it is
reasonable for a government manager to credit the
allegation more if it is consistent with what the
manager knows of the character of the accused.
Likewise, a manager may legitimately want to
discipline an employee based on complaints by
patrons that the employee has been rude, even
though these complaints are hearsay.251
generally not harmful..., we have given substantial weight to government employers'
reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved is on a matter of
public concern." Id. The plurality went on to say, however, that in certain situations
"government employees, like any citizen, may have a strong, legitimate interest in
speaking out on public matters. Id. In many situations the government may have to
make a substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive before it
may be punished." Id. (emphasis added).
248 Id.
249 Id. at 1891.
2 Id. There was some question in Waters as to whether the manager would be
immune from liability. However, the Court did not reach that question. Id.
251 Id. at 1888. In fact, however, some of Justice O'Connor's concerns are
effectively addressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVlD. 801(a).
Under the Rules basic definition of hearsay, customer complaints would not be hearsay
because the content of the customer's speech is not coming in for the "truth of the matter
asserted," but just to show what the customer said. See id. 801(c) advisory committee's
note. For example, if a waiter called a patron a "bad tipper," it would not matter
whether or not the patron actually was a bad tipper, but only that the waiter said it. For
this purpose only, such a statement would be admissible under the Federal Rules.
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The plurality admitted that giving the employer the
opportunity to use hearsay and the like would risk the possibility of
erroneously punishing some protected speech by employees.252
Justice O'Connor suggested, however, that the remedy for this is
statutory or common law protection, not the Constitution.21'
Despite its concern about the prerogative of a government
employer, the plurality rejected Justice Scalia's suggestion.that an
employer need merely act in good faith to meet the requirements of
the Constitution.25 4 Rather, the plurality suggested a "reasonableness"
standard, under which employers would be required to make a
reasonable effort to discover the truth of allegations.255 Under such
a standard, it would be unreasonable for an employer to base a
decision on no evidence at all, or on weak evidence, when stronger
evidence is clearly available.25 6 For example, "if. . . an employee
is accused of writing an improper letter to the editor, [but] instead of
just reading the letter, the employer decides what it said based on
unreliable hearsay," this would be considered an unreasonable
effort.25 7 The plurality indicated that, in general, an employer should
be required to utilize the degree of care "that a reasonable manager
would use before making an employment decision-discharge,
suspension, reprimand, or whatever else-of the sort involved in the
particular case. ,211
The plurality also rejected Justice Stevens' argument that the
"reasonable employer" test "provides less protection for a
12 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888.
2"3 Id. at 1890.
254 Id. at 1889.
255 Id.
2M Id.
27 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1889.
1' Id. In articulating this standard, the plurality distinguished Waters from cases like
Pickering v. Board of Ecduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), and Connick, where the focus had been on the "intent"
of the employer to discriminate. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1889. The plurality noted that
in those cases, the employers had known the true content of the employee's speech, and
simply had to decide whether they should or could fire the employee because of that
content. Id. However, the test in Waters goes to the employer's attempt to find out the
relevant information in the first place, not the subsequent reaction to that information.
See id. (stating that in none of these cases was the issue of what should happen if the
employer holds an erroneous and unreasonable belief about what the employee said).
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fundamental constitutional right than the law ordinarily provides for
less important rights. 25 9 In rejecting Justice Stevens' argument, the
plurality stated:
We have never held that it is a violation of the
Constitution for a government employer to discharge
an employee based on substantively incorrect
information. Where an employee has a property
interest in her job, the only protection we have found
the Constitution gives her is a right to adequate
procedure. 60
Applying its "reasonableness" analysis to the facts of Waters,
the plurality explained that if the hospital management "really did
believe" the story told by the employee who had considered
transferring to obstetrics, based on a reasonable investigation-
including employee interviews-and "fired Churchill because of it,"
then the employer should prevail.2 6 However, because Churchill had
raised a disputed issue of fact as to whether she was actually fired for
other nondisruptive statements which could constitute protected
speech, the Court remanded for further fact-finding below.262
Although a majority of the Justices did not expressly adopt the
"reasonableness" standard, Justice Souter's concurring opinion
correctly noted that in light of the voting lineup on the Court, the
plurality's opinion is effectively binding on the lower courts.2 By
decisively rejecting Justice Scalia's "good faith" standard, 2" the Court
had appropriately ensured that public employees will retain some
measure of meaningful First Amendment protection, even when they
and their employers disagree on the facts. 265 As the plurality pointed
out, Justice Scalia's formulation would effectively import an intent
requirement into the First Amendment-a requirement that Justice
259 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890.
2W Id.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 1891.
2 Id. at 1893 (Souter, J., concurring).
2 See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1889.
26 See id.
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Scalia has sought to impose on several occasions, but which the Court
has generally rejected. 2"
By also rejecting the Seventh Circuit's standard, however, the
Court's decision means that, at least in some situations, it is likely
that public employees will be disciplined-or fired for engaging in
speech protected by the First Amendment. As Justice Stevens
pointed out in his dissent, this will effectively provide less protection
for First Amendment rights than for some contractual and statutory
rights of employees.267 Waters will clearly not be the last case to be
considered by the Court concerning the free speech rights of public
employees. It remains to be seen how the Court's "government as
employer" approach will affect this and other decisions concerning
government employees and the First Amendment.
C. Government Regulation of Speech on Private Property:
City of Ladue v. Gilleo
In City of Ladue v. Gilleo,268 the Court faced what it
described as the "mirror image "269 of the case of Linmark Associates,
Inc. v. Willingboro.270 In Linmark, the Court held unconstitutional
an ordinance that prohibited residents from posting "For Sale" signs
in their front yards.27' In contrast, Gilleo concerned an ordinance
that allowed "For Sale" and other commercial signs, but banned all
others.272 Included among these "others" were signs posted by
Margaret Gilleo protesting the Persian Gulf war.2"
Gilleo had initially placed a sign reading "Say No to War in
I56 d.; see Elliot M. Mincberg, A Look at Recent Supreme Court Decisions: Judicial
Prior Restraint and the First Amendment, 44 HAST. L.J. 871, 874-75 (1993) (discussing
Justice Scalia's attempts to impose an "intent" requirement in First Amendment cases).
20 Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1898 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
' See id. at 2042.
2o 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
211 Id. at 95-97.
2n 114 S. Ct. at 2040.
m Id.
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the Persian Gulf" on her front lawn. 4  When this sign
"disappeared," she put up another, which was subsequently knocked
down.2 75 When she complained to police, she was told that such
signs were illegal in Ladue. 276 Gilleo went to the City Council and
asked for a "variance" by which the Council would waive the anti-
sign ordinance for purposes of the "public interest." 277 Gilleo was
turned down, and she subsequently filed a suit in federal court,
claiming that the ordinance violated her First Amendment free speech
rights.278
The trial court issued a preliminary injunction against the
ordinance, and in response, the City Council passed a new ordinance
banning all signs with the exception of "residential identification
signs," signs advertising property "for sale, lease or exchange,"
commercial signs in commercial districts and on gas stations, and
signs "for churches, religious institutions, and schools., 27 9  In a
statement of purpose, the Council justified the ordinance on aesthetic
grounds.280
The district court found the new ordinance unconstitutional,281
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed,282 on the basis that the ordinance was
a "content-based" regulation treating commercial speech more
favorably than noncommercial speech, and that the need to protect
such speech was not outweighed by Ladue's "substantial," but not
of ~ 21compelling," interests. 83 Justice Stevens wrote for a unanimous
Supreme Court in affirming the lower court decision,2 with Justice
O'Connor writing a concurring opinion.285




2"7 Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2040.
Z' Gilleo v. City of Ladue, 774 F. Supp. 1559 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
' Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2041.
o See id.
22) Gilleo, 774 F. Supp. at 1562-63.
22 Gilleo v. City of Ladue, 986 F.2d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1182, 1183-84.
28 Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2040.
2 Id. at 2047-48 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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decision in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego.28 In that case,
the Court held unconstitutional a city ordinance banning all off-site
advertising and on-site noncommercial advertising, despite San
Diego's reliance on an "aesthetics" justification.28 7 As Justice Stevens
pointed out, the plurality in Metromedia, Inc. judged the ordinance
to be content based because it made a commercial/noncommercial
distinction for on-site speech, 2"8 whereas Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion in that case relied more generally on the "practical effect" of
the ordinance, which was to totally ban noncommercial billboards.289
Justice Stevens went on to distinguish the Court's decision in
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent,29 where the Court upheld, on aesthetics grounds, a ban of
signs on public property. 29' He noted that in coming to its decision,
the Court distinguished the Los Angeles ordinance from one that
might ban similar signs on private property.2 92
Thus in considering the Court's previous case law on the
subject of anti-sign ordinances, Justice Stevens found two general
principles, both of which could be drawn from Metromedia, Inc.293
First, as the plurality in that case implied, measures which restrict
"too little" speech may be unconstitutional because they "discriminate
on the basis of the signs' messages. '' 294  But second, as Justice
Brennan's concurrence in Metromedia, Inc. maintained, measures
may also be successfully challenged if they prohibit "too much
protected speech. "2 95
Expanding on the "underinclusiveness" theory, Justice Stevens
noted that "an exemption from an otherwise permissible regulation of
speech may represent a governmental 'attempt to give one side of a
453 U.S. 490 (1981); Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2042-43.
1 Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 510-21.
2 Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2042; Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 514-15.
29 Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2042; Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 525-26 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
290 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2043.
29 Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2043; Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 816.
292 GiUeo, 114 S. Ct. at 2043.
29 Id.
2 Id.
9 Id.; Metromedia, Inc., 435 U.S. at 521 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the
people."2 He recognized that the City of Ladue could raise a
potentially valid argument against the underinclusiveness notion
because of its claim that the exemptions were "only adventitiously
connected with content," and were based on a "unique public need[]
to permit certain kinds of speech. "297 But even if this explanation had
been satisfactory on "underinclusiveness" grounds, Justice Stevens
explained, it only strengthened the argument that the ordinance was
"overinclusive."29  As the Court noted: "Exemptions from an
otherwise legitimate regulation of... speech may be noteworthy for
a reason quite apart from the risks of viewpoint and content
discrimination: they may diminish the credibility of the government's
rationale for restricting speech in the first place. "2
Thus, while claiming an aesthetic need to ban signs, Ladue
also admitted that some signs were "too vital to be banned. ,,300 If this
were true, then the City might have to show why Gilleo's signs were
not "too vital. "30 Recognizing that the City might cure this defect by
simply banning all signs, the Court decided that it would "first ask
whether Ladue [could] properly prohibit Gilleo from displaying her
sign, and then, only if necessary, consider the separate question
whether it was improper for the City to simultaneously permit other
signs. ,302 Significantly, at least according to Justice O'Connor, this
analysis assumed arguendo that the City's ban was truly content
neutral. 303
Relying on its decision in Linmark, which found that an
interest in preventing "white flight" was not great enough to justify





30' Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2044.
m Id. (emphasis added).
31 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). It was this change in emphasis which prompted
Justice O'Connor to write her concurrence, which attempted to bolster the continued
validity of content-based/content-neutral analysis. See infra notes 315-19 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's concurrence).
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a prohibition on "For Sale" signs,'" the Court recognized that there
is an even greater need to protect "absolutely pivotal speech," such
as that protesting an imminent war.3"' This was especially true where
the practical impact of the ordinance was even greater than in
Linmark; the impact of this ordinance was, essentially the banning of
all political signs.30 6
What particularly troubled the Court was what had troubled
Justice Brennan in Metromedia, Inc. -the fact that the ordinance had
the effect of "foreclos[ing] an entire medium of expression. 30 7 The
Court rejected the City's argument that residents may rely instead on
media such as handbills, telephone calls or bumper stickers .30  The
Court noted that this would not truly "leave open an ample alternative
channel[] for communication," '° particularly because the very fact a
sign is displayed at one's home can have a unique and distinct
meaning in and of itself:
A sign advocating "Peace in the Gulf" in the front
lawn of a retired general or decorated war veteran
may provoke a different reaction than the same sign
in a 10-year-old child's bedroom window or the same
message on a bumper sticker of a passing automobile.
An espousal of socialism may carry different
implications when displayed on the grounds of a
stately mansion than when pasted on a factory wall or
an ambulatory sandwich board.310
30' 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
30 Gileo, 114 S. Ct. at 2044-45.
Id. at 2045.
Id. at 2046; see Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 525-26 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(arguing that "the practical effect of the San Diego ordinance is to eliminate the billboard
as an effective medium 'of communication").
3m Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2046.
"9 Id.
310 Id. The Court also recognized the value of such residential signs as a "cheap and
convenient form of communication," allowing a citizen who cannot afford to print up
handbills or place television advertisements nevertheless express him or herself
effectively, as well asthe fact that such signs are likely the most effective way to target
a message at one's immediate neighbors. Id.
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The Court concluded by recognizing the special respect due
to "individual liberty in the home," and particularly the right to speak
there.3" Although the government has an obvious need to regulate
"various competing uses," Justice Stevens wrote, "most Americans
would be understandably dismayed ... to learn that it was illegal to
display from their window an 8- by 11-inch sign expressing their
political views. 3 2 The Court recognized that such signs may indeed
constitute "visual clutter," and in certain circumstances, such as signs
posted for a fee, may be regulated.3"' In its current, broad form,
however, the ordinance clearly violated the First Amendment. 1 4
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion expressed some
concern about the Court's assumption "arguendo" that the ordinance
was content neutral.31 Noting that, in the past, the Court had begun
its evaluation of such regulations by determining whether they were
content based or content neutral, she suggested that this analysis
might have been more appropriate in Gilleo."3 She acknowledged
that exclusive reliance on such an approach has been criticized by
Justice Stevens and others, but maintained that it has substantial
merits, both practical and theoretical, outweighing its flaws.31 7
As reflected in Justice O'Connor's concurrence, the result in
Gilleo was probably inevitable, regardless of the form of analysis
utilized.318 Yet it is this very inevitability that arguably bolsters
Justice Stevens' approach. Where government bans purely political
speech on private property, it should not matter whether the
government's action is content based or content neutral; there should
be no significant or compelling state interest that could justify such
a prohibition of pure political speech.31 9 Viewed in this way, Justice
Stevens' approach has the potential to make an important contribution
to First Amendment jurisprudence. Rather than replacing content
3" Id. at 2047.
312 Id.
313 Gilleo, 114 S. ct. at 2047.
314 Id.
"' Id. at 2047-48 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
316 Id. at 2048.
311 Id. at 2047-48.
3 See 114 S. Ct. at 2048 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
3 See id. at 2047.
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based analysis, his approach arguably provides an additional method
which can be utilized in some cases to analyze government rules that
limit speech. Properly applied, the net result may well be to enhance
protection for the First Amendment.
D. Regulation of Professional Advertising: Ibanez
v. Florida Department of Business and Professional
Regulation, Board of Accountancy
In Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional
Regulation, Board of Accountancy,2 ° the Supreme Court was asked
to decide whether a state could prohibit a licensed professional from
listing certain credentials in her advertisement, without violating First
Amendment protections on commercial speech. 21 In 1992, Silvia
Ibanez, a practicing member of the Florida Bar, was licensed by the
Florida Board of Accountancy as a Certified Public Accountant
(CPA), and was authorized by a private organization, known as the
Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, to use the title
"Certified Financial Planner" (CFP).3 2 She used both her CPA and
CFP designations in her legal advertising, and on her law office
stationary and business cards. 23 Based on an anonymous tip, the
State Board charged Ibanez with violating state law prohibiting
"fraudulent, false, deceptive, or misleading" advertising by using the
designation CPA which "implied that she abides by the provisions of
the [Florida Public Accountancy Act]," and by using the designation
CFP which had not been granted Board approval. 4
Ibanez claimed that she was practicing law, not accountancy,
and thus was not under the Board's jurisdiction. 25 Additionally, she
argued that her use of CPA and CFP constituted truthful, commercial
320 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994).
321 Id. at 2087.
32 Id. at 2085.
32/ id. at 2086.
324 Id. at 2087. The Board also charged her with practicing in an unlicensed firm,
but this charge was dropped before the proceedings were completed. Id.
32 Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2087.
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speech for which she could not properly be sanctioned. 2 But despite
her arguments, and even despite a recommendation by a Board
hearing officer that all charges against her be dropped, the Board
found Ibanez guilty on both counts.327 The Board's decision was
upheld by the state appellate court.328
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 2 9 and reversed the
Board's decision.33 Justice Ginsburg wrote- for a unanimous Court
on the CPA issue, and for a seven-two majority on the CFP issue."'
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote a partial
dissent. 3 2
The Court's analysis, especially on the CPA issue, largely
draws on prior precedent with respect to commercial speech. Justice
Ginsburg began by reiterating the principle that "only false, deceptive
or misleading commercial speech may be banned,"3"3 and speech that
does not fall in one of these categories may be restricted only "if the
State shows that the restriction directly and materially advances a
substantial state interest in a manner no more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest. "334 In accord with prior commercial
speech cases, the Court explained, it is not enough for the state to
engage in "'speculation or conjecture,"' but rather it must show that
the harms are real, and the proposed restrictions will "'alleviate them
to a material degree.'""
Justice Ginsburg's analysis of the CPA issue, which was
supported by all nine Justices, was short and to the point. The Court
rejected the claim that Ibanez's use of the term CPA was misleading
326 Id.
321 id. at 2088.
" Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 621
So. 2d 435, 435 (Fla. App. 1993).
lbanez v. Florida Dep't of Professional Regulation, 114 S. Ct. 751 (1994).
33 lbanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2088.
331 Id. at 2086.
332 Id. at 2092 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
3s3 Id. at 2088 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985)).
33 Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
33S Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2089 (quoting Edenfield v. Pane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800
(1993)).
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because she had claimed to be outside the Board's jurisdiction.336
Initially, the Court noted that Ibanez was no longer claiming to be
outside the Board's jurisdiction, and that even if she had been, the
First Amendment would not allow her to be sanctioned for such a
belief.337 In addition, the Court explained that it was not enough that
Ibanez said she was unwilling to comply with the Board's
regulations.33 Rather, the Board was required to provide specific
evidence that she did not comply.33 9 Because the Board did not
present this evidence, and because Ibanez truly held a CPA license,
the Court could not "imagine how consumers [would] be misled by
her truthful representation to that effect."340
The CFP issue raised different questions because the State
claimed that the use of the designation could mislead the public into
believing that Ibanez was a state-certified financial planner.34 In
addressing this issue, both the majority3 42 and the dissent 43 relied on
the Court's 1990 decision in Peel v. Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission of Illinois.3" In that case, the Court held
that "an attorney's use of the designation 'Certified Civil Trial
Specialist By the National Board of Trial Advocacy' was neither
actually nor inherently misleading."34 In light of the "'complete
absence of evidence of deception,' "346 with respect to Ibanez, Peel
was clearly applicable.3 47 The Board nevertheless argued that the
CFP designation was "'potentially misleading,' entitling the Board to
'enact measures short of a total ban to prevent deception or
confusion.' "348 But relying on Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary




3o Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2089.
34 Id.
342 Id. at 2089-92.
3 Id. at 2092-94 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
3" 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
34 Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2089 (quoting Peel, 496 U.S. at 106).
w Id.
34 Id.
3 Id. at 2090 (citing Brief of Respondent at 33, (citing Peel, 496 U.S. at 116)
(Marshall, J., concurring)).
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Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio349 and Edenfield v. Fane,35 ° the
Court rejected this argument, stating that use of words like
"potentially misleading" does not fulfill the State's burden to show
that restrictions are necessary to alleviate real harms.35 t As the
majority explained, the Board produced no such evidence.3"2
On the facts of the case, the majority also rejected the State's
argument that it should be allowed to require at least that a
professional include a lengthy disclaimer on her advertising,
letterhead, or business cards explaining the origin of a particular
designation." 3 While expressing no general opinion in this area, the
Court found that the disclaimer described by the Board was so broad
that it "effectively rule[d] out notation of the 'specialist' designation
on a business card or letterhead, or in a yellow pages listing."'4
Justice O'Connor's opinion disagreed with the majority on the
CFP issue. She maintained that the use of the term "certified" was
potentially misleading, and that in Peel, the facts stated on the
attorney's letterhead were "true and verifiable," so that, at the very
least, a required disclaimer was justified in Ibanez.355  As the
majority explained, however, Ibanez's CFP claim was as easily
verifiable as the "certified" civil trial specialist credential in Peel, and
Ibanez was duty-bound under ethical rules to supply reference
3 471 U.S. 626, 648-49 (1985) (holding that only false, deceptive, or misleading
commercial speech may be banned).
3-0 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993) (holding that a state has the burden to "demonstrate
that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree").
311 Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2090.
352 Id.
353 Id.
"4 Id. at 2090-91. According to the Court, the Florida law prohibited the use of any
.specialist" designation:
Unless accompanied by a disclaimer, made "in the immediate
proximity of the statement that implies formal recognition as a
specialist"; the disclaimer must "stat[e] that the recognizing agency
is not affiliated with or sanctioned by the state or federal
government," and it must set out the recognizing agency's
"requirements for recognition, including, but not limited to,
educational, experience and testing."
Id. (quoting Brief of Respondent at 33-35) (citations omitted).
55 Id. at 2092 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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information if asked to do so. 3 56  In other circumstances, the
majority's opinion leaves open the possibility that a disclaimer of the
type endorsed by Justice O'Connor could be required. 5 7 But the
Court's ruling in Ibanez makes clear that few restrictions on
professional advertising and similar types of commercial speech will
survive First Amendment scrutiny based simply on "'unsupported
assertions'" of a mere potential to mislead. 58
E. Government Regulation of Cable Television:
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,359 the Supreme
Court addressed a First Amendment challenge3' 6 to the "must-carry"
provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 (1992 Cable Act).36  These provisions
require local cable television companies to carry the signals of local
broadcast stations on their systems. 62  The provisions were
challenged on First Amendment grounds by a coalition of cable
companies, who sued the United States and the FCC.363 A statutorily
designated three-judge court denied summary judgment, upholding the
Act. 3 In a decision that produced five opinions, the Supreme Court
reversed.365
In Part I of the opinion-the only part written for a unanimous
Court-Justice Kennedy provided a lengthy description of cable
television, of its relationship to the broadcast industry, and of the
1992 Cable Act.366 Justice Kennedy first explained that with the need
Ib Tanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2090 n.9.
... See id. at 2088-89.
3" Id. at 2092 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 648-49).
3" 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
Id. at 2451.
36' 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (Supp. 1992).
62 Id. § 534(a).
30 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 35-36 (D.D.C. 1993).
3" Id. at 51.
15 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2451-52.
3" Id. at 2451-56.
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for "point-to-point" connections between cable operators and
individual homes, the cable industry relies on a much greater physical
infrastructure than broadcast television, and thus "may depend for its
very existence upon express permission from local governing
authorities. "367 Despite these physical limitations, Justice Kennedy
noted that cable differs from broadcast television because it eliminates
the "signal interference" associated with over-the-air broadcasts, and
allows the consumer to receive a far greater number of channels than
broadcast television.36 ' Justice Kennedy also noted that unlike
broadcast stations, the extreme cost of constructing cable systems and
local franchising requirements mean that cable operators usually have
a monopoly on cable in a particular geographic area.3 69
Because of the differences between cable and broadcast, the
"increasing concentration of economic power" in the cable industry,
and the fact that most of the more than sixty percent of households
that subscribe to cable cannot "receive broadcast television services,"
Congress found that the cable industry had the ability to "endanger[]
the ability of over-the-air broadcast television stations to compete for
a viewing audience and thus for necessary operating revenues."370
Furthermore, because cable is in direct competition with broadcast,
cable operators have an economic "incentive to harm broadcast
competitors. "371 Justice Kennedy explained that the purpose of the
1992 Cable Act, was, therefore, to cushion some of the impact cable
television was having on the broadcast industry.372
Under the 1992 Cable Act, cable television operators are
required to carry a certain number of local commercial and public
broadcast stations on their systems.3 73  The number of stations
operators are required to carry varies depending on the number of
channels the cable system has, but, in actuality, almost all cable
systems have some "must-carry" obligations. 74 These must-carry
'7 Id. at 2451-52.
3 Id. at 2452.
m Id. at 2454.
'70 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2454.
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35 (Supp. 1992); see Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2453.
7 Turner. 114 S. Ct. at 2453-54.
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provisions were controversial from inception, and, in the days before
passage of the Act, lead to intense lobbying efforts from both cable
and broadcast operators. 75 The Act finally became law on October
5, 1992, after Congress overrode President Bush's veto for the first,
and only, time in his presidency.376
In upholding the 1992 Cable Act below, the three-judge court
explained that the Act was simply regulatory legislation enacted for
anti-trust and fair trade purposes .) The court rejected the cable
companies' claim that the Act was content based, and thus subject to
strict scrutiny .) Instead, the court found the Act to be content
neutral, and it thus proceeded to analyze the Act under the
intermediate scrutiny, standard, ultimately concluding that
"preservation of local broadcasting is an important governmental
interest, and that must-carry provisions are sufficiently tailored to
serve that interest. ,379
Justice Kennedy similarly began his legal analysis of the Act
by assessing whether it was content based or content neutral. 8 All
of the Justices, except Justice Stevens,"' joined Justice Kennedy in
specifically concluding that the less rigorous First Amendment
standard applicable to broadcast television restrictions should not
apply to cable.3" 2 Justice Kennedy noted that the justification for the
less rigorous broadcast standard is that the number of broadcast
frequencies requires the government to restrict broadcast stations. 33
This same limited channel capacity does not exist in the world of
cable, Justice Kennedy explained, and thus that rationale for a less
I7s Id. at 2454. See generally Paul Farki, Closing the Cable Rate Loopholes; Prices
Fall for Subscribers in 5 out of 7 Washington Area Communities, WASH. POST, Aug. 5,
1994, at B1 (noting that capping cable prices through regulation achieved Congress's
goal of pushing down the cost of cable television services).
376 See Stuart N. Brotman, The Curtain Rises on Clinton's FCC; Federal
Communications Commission, BUS. COMM. REv., Mar. 1993, at 16.
3" Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 40 (D.D.C. 1993).
"' Id. at 47-48.
'79 id. at 45-47.
See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458.
' See id. at 2472-81 (Stevens, J., concurring).
s Id. at 2456.
See id. at 2456-57.
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rigorous standard does not exist.'"
Justice Kennedy also rejected the government's argument that
regulations on the cable industry, like any other industry-specific anti-
trust regulations, should be treated under the "rational basis"
standard.385 Distinguishing Turner from cases where the Sherman
Antitrust Act-a law of general application-has been applied to
enterprises that are usually protected by the First Amendment,3"'
Justice Kennedy noted that the 1992 Cable Act "single[s] out the
press, or certain elements thereof, for special treatment [thus]
'pos[ing] a particular danger of abuse by the State."'" 8 7 Ultimately,
Justice Kennedy concluded that "some measure of heightened First
Amendment scrutiny [was] demanded."388
In determining that the Act should be considered content
neutral, Justice Kennedy wrote for five members of the Court, losing
the support of Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas and Ginsburg, but
picking up Justice Stevens' vote. 89 While recognizing that the Act
certainly imposes a burden on the cable industry, and does distinguish
between speakers in the television programming market, Justice
Kennedy found no explicit reference in the Act to the content of
speech.3 9' Furthermore, he found no evidence that Congress had
used the restrictions as "a subtle means of exercising a content
preference."39"' As he pointed out, the must-carry benefit applies to
all broadcasters regardless of content-"be they commercial or non-
' See id. Justice Kennedy also rejected the government's argument that cable
restrictions should be met with a less rigorous standard because, like broadcasters, cable
operators suffer "market dysfunction" brought on by physical limitations. Id. at 2457.
Justice Kennedy noted that the theory behind the less rigorous standard is not the
"economic characteristics of the broadcast market," but the "special physical
characteristics of broadcast transmission" that in turn limit the number of stations and
require government regulation. Id. Justice Kennedy did acknowledge, however, that
the "unique physical characteristics" of cable should be taken into account in some
fashion in analyzing regulation of cable. Id.
38S Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458.
s Id. (citing Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) & AP v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
s Id. (quoting Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987)).
3 Id. at 2458.
389 Id.
" Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2460.
391 Id.
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commercial, independent or network-affiliated, English or Spanish
language, religious or secular."3 92
Justice Kennedy rejected the argument that the motive behind
the Act was Congress's preference for the type of programming
found on broadcast television.393 Rather, he credited the explanation
found within the statute: "'There is a substantial governmental
interest in promoting the continued availability of such free television
programming, especially for viewers who are unable to afford other
means of receiving programming.' "94
Justice Kennedy also discounted the claim, made by a
dissenting judge below, that a "preference for broadcast stations
'automatically entails content requirements.' " The dissenting judge
below, Judge Williams, had argued that, because broadcast
programming, unlike that found on cable, was subject to statutory and
regulatory content restrictions, Congress, by enacting the "must
carry" provisions, had given itself control over what programming
can and cannot be shown on cable. .396 Justice Kennedy found that this
argument "exaggerates the extent to which the FCC is permitted to
intrude into matters affecting the content of broadcast
programming.1397  He noted that, despite the lower standard of
scrutiny applicable to broadcast regulation, the FCC could not censor
material or interfere with journalistic judgment. 39  Furthermore,
despite its ability to inquire whether licensees had served the
community, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the FCC had no power
319 Id. at 2463.
I ld. at 2461.
3 Id. (quoting Conference Report S. 12, Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, 138 CONG. REC. H8308 § 2(a)(12) (statement of Rep.
Dingell)). Justice Kennedy did acknowledge that one reason given for maintaining
broadcast television was Congress's belief that it had some "intrinsic value," based on
its ability to provide viewers with educational and informational programs. Id. at 2462.
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy did not find any evidence that Congress was denying that
cable had a similar intrinsic value. See id. Rather, he believed that Congress was
simply explaining why it was important that those citizens without access to cable
continue to receive broadcast television. Id.
39 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2462 (quoting Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 58 (Williams, J.,
dissenting)).
I Turner, 819 F. Supp. at 57-58 (Williams, J., dissenting).
31 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2463.
39 id.
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to "'impose .. . its private notions of what the public ought to
hear. ' "399
Justice Kennedy also rejected three other arguments raised by
the cable companies in support of the claim that the must-carry
provisions should be subjected to strict scrutiny.' Addressing the
claim that the provisions "compel speech," Justice Kennedy
distinguished Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo4°t from
Turner.4"2 In Tornillo, the Court had held unconstitutional a state
statute that required newspapers to give equal space to political
candidates in order to reply to editorial criticisms.' 3 Although the
law had not actually prevented the newspaper from expressing its
editorial view, the Court found the "practical effect" of the statute
was to "deter newspapers from speaking in unfavorable terms about
political candidates. "4' Unlike in Tornillo, however, Justice Kennedy
found the 1992 Cable Act restrictions to be content neutral, because
they were not triggered by speech of a particular content.4"' In
addition, Justice Kennedy found no suggestion that the 1992 Cable
Act would force the cable operators to change their programming,
particularly as those same operators had been voluntarily carrying
broadcast signals for many years."' Finally, he noted that unlike the
newspaper market-where a speaker denied access by one publication
may well be welcomed by another-cable markets tend to be
monopolized, meaning the cable operators "can... silence the voice
of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch. ""
The plurality also rejected the claim that strict scrutiny should
apply because the 1992 Cable Act favors one set of speakers
(broadcast programmers) over another (cable programmers).08
39 Id. (quoting Network Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25
Fed. Reg. 7,293 (1960)).
400 Id. at 2464.
401 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
402 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2465.
- Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258; see Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2464-65.
- Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256-57; see Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2465.
4w Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2465.
'O Id.
4w Id. at 2466.
4W Id.
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Justice Kennedy made clear that the Court's decision in the campaign-
financing case Buckley v. Valeo"4 9 did not mean that any restriction
that muted the voice of one speaker to enhance the voice of another
was subject to strict scrutiny.41 Rather, the guiding principle behind
the Buckley decision, according to the majority, was the Court's
belief that the Constitution does not allow the legislature to prefer one
group because of the substance of its speech.41 The plurality
explained that in Buckley, the government was trying to'ensure that
the "political speech of the wealthy did not drown out the speech of
others."412 Conversely, the must-carry provisions in Turner were not
based on the content of the broadcaster's or cable operator's speech,
and thus Buckley was not controlling.413
The final argument for strict scrutiny raised by the cable
industry was based on its contention that the 1992 Cable Act was to
be applied in a discriminatory manner because it did not apply to
other analogous video delivery systems. 4  These include multi-
channel multi-point distribution systems and satellite master antenna
television. 5 Justice Kennedy dismissed this claim, pointing to the
Court's decision in Leathers v. Medlock,1 7 where it upheld a tax that
applied solely to cable television services .4 1  He further noted that
"heightened scrutiny is unwarranted when the differential treatment
is 'justified by some special characteristic of' the particular medium
424 U.S. 1 (1976).





411 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2468. Multi-channel multi-point distribution systems use
one transmitter from a high building, which beams signals to thousands of homes. See
Robert Brehl, Firm Fights for Right to Snip Cable's Cord; CRTC Doesn't Allow Wireless
Cable TV System, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 15, 1995, at BI. It is used in remote areas
where it is too expensive to run traditional cable. See id. Satellite master antenna
television provides cable signals directly to microwave dishes on the tops of apartment
buildings, as well as office buildings, where each apartment or office is wired into an
on-site satellite dish. See Jonathan Ringel, Apartment Life-Some Apartment Complexes
Have Own Cable TV Sstems, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 18, 1994, at H45.
416 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2468.
411 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
418 Id. at 440; see Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2468.
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being regulated."4" 9 In this case, that "special characteristic" was the
"bottleneck monopoly power" of the cable industry. 420
Having dismissed the government's argument for a rational
basis standard and the cable industry's argument for strict scrutiny,
the majority concluded that the appropriate standard to apply was
intermediate scrutiny. 41 As Justice Kennedy explained, a regulation
satisfies such scrutiny if it "'promotes a substantial government
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation. ",422
In analyzing the must-carry provisions under this test, Justice
Kennedy first listed the three "interrelated interests" Congress had
used to justify the provision: (1) preserving the benefits of free
broadcast television; (2) promoting "widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources;" and (3) promoting "fair
competition. "14 ' "[V]iewed in the abstract," Justice Kennedy
concluded, "we have no difficulty concluding that each of them is an
important governmental interest. ,424 While recognizing the general
deference given by courts to congressional determinations, he
emphasized that "Congress['s] predictive judgments . . . are [not]
insulated from meaningful judicial review altogether. ,421 In this case,
the "predictive judgments" were Congress's determination that
without a must-carry provision, cable operators would drop broadcast
stations, and those stations would deteriorate or go out of business.426
Justice Kennedy pointed to the failure of the district court
record to include sufficient evidence that broadcast stations needed
the protection of must-carry provisions.427  He also criticized the
"paucity of evidence . . . concerning the actual effects of must-carry
on the speech of cable operators"-evidence necessary to determine
49 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2468 (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribunal Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983)).
40 Id. at 2468.
421 Id. at 2469.
41 Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
'4 Id. at 2469 (citations omitted).
424 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
425 Id. at 2471.
426 Id.
427 Id. at 2472.
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whether must-carry suppresses "substantially more speech than.
necessary. ,428 In light of this conclusion, the district court decision
was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.42 9
Justice Stevens concurred in part and in the judgment.43 ' He
largely took issue with Justice Kennedy's conclusion, supported by
only three other members of the Court,431 that the case should be
remanded for further consideration.4 32 Based on the evidence before
Congress, he argued that "it [was] a practical certainty that a
broadcaster dropped from the local cable system would suffer
substantial economic harm. ,433 Although he admitted that there was
no evidence that broadcast stations were actually going bankrupt,
Justice Stevens ventured that an "industry need not be in its death
throes before Congress may act to protect it from economic harm
threatened by monopoly. ",434 He also expressed concern that, on
being told that they need to show that "substantially more speech than
necessary ' 43 is being restricted to prevail at the district court level,
cable companies will choose to "drop cable programs rather than
seeking to increase total channel capacity. ,436 Ultimately, however,
Justice Stevens was concerned that without his vote there would be
no. majority or plurality for any position, and thus chose to join the
Kennedy bloc of Justices, and concurred in the judgment.4 7
Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Justices Scalia and Ginsburg joined, and
SId. Justice Blackmun, who joined all of Justice Kennedy's opinion, was not as
concerned by such lack of evidence. In his concurring opinion, he emphasized the
"paramount importance" of giving "substantial deference" to Congress, but ultimately
concluded that in this case the district court would "no doubt . . . benefit" from
additional evidence. Id. at 2472-73 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
42 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2472.
SId. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment).
431 These members were Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun and Souter,*who were the
only three Justices to join all of Justice Kennedy's opinion. Id. at 2451.
432 Id. at 2473.
41 Id. at 2474.
4 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment).
435 Id. at 2472 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
-' Id. at 2475.
437 Id.
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in which Justice Thomas joined in part.4"8 Although she agreed with
the Court's conclusion that cable programmers stand in the same First
Amendment position as other members of the more traditional media,
Justice O'Connor did not agree that the must-carry provision was
completely content neutral.4 9 While conceding that there may well
have been content-neutral reasons for the legislation, she did not
believe that the congressional findings relating to the value of public
and commercial broadcast television for news, informational and
educational purposes, evinced a content-neutral purpose."40
In the second part of her opinion, which Justice Thomas chose
not to join," Justice O'Connor argued that even if the legislation was
content neutral, it failed the intermediate scrutiny test because it was
not narrowly tailored. 442  Drawing analogies to other First
Amendment speech cases, she argued that Congress could not justify
restrictions on all cable operators because some cable operators "may
be motivated by anticompetitive impulses, or might lead to . . . [a]
broadcaster going out of business.""
Finally, Justice O'Connor argued that, where possible, the
market, not Congress, should govern which programming ends up on
cable systems." While she admitted that there are instances where
Congress has and could continue to regulate cable, she argued that in
this case the legislation was simply too broad to be in compliance
with the Constitution. 445
By no means does the decision in Turner signal the end of the
I d. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
4 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
440 Id. at 2478.
"I Id. at 2475.
42 Id. at 2479.
" Id. O'Connor pointed to the Court's decisions in cases like Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 (1939) to support her claim that "[if the government wants to avoid
littering, it may ban littering, but it may not ban all leafletting." Turner, 114 S. Ct. at
2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
" Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2480 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
4" Id. at 2481. Justice Ginsburg wrote her own opinion essentially adopting Judge
Wiliams' dissent at the district court level. Id. Although she did not think that the
provisions differentiated on the basis of viewpoint, she did believe that they reflected a
"content preference." Id. Furthermore, she agreed with Judge Williams that the
alleged risks to over-the-air broadcast stations "remainO imaginary." Id.
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legal dispute on regulation of cable television. Proceedings before
the district court in Turner have begun," and will likely lead to
another petition to the Supreme Court. FCC and local action to
regulate cable television will also continue, along with legislative and
other proposals affecting not only cable, but also the entire future
"information superhighway." By rejecting strict scrutiny for
government regulation not based on content, the Court has opened the
door for at least some regulation to accomplish such goals as
fostering diversity and competition. At the same time, content-based
regulation of cable and other media, such as attempts to regulate so-
called "indecency," should receive particularly close scrutiny. And
by requiring intermediate scrutiny in Turner, moreover, the Court has
ensured at least some meaningful First Amendment scrutiny even as
to content-neutral regulation in this emerging area.
"'See Norman M. Sinel et al., Recent Developments in Cable Law, in
COMMUNICATIONS LAW: 1994 503 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary
Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3924 (1994)) (stating that in late September,
1994, a three-judge district court, which is hearing the case on remand, directed the
parties to submit cross-motions for summary judgment by March 1, 1995).

